Conflict", this Policy Brief lays out a multi-tiered framework for counter-terrorism strategic communications programmes and concrete evaluation of programme results. The Policy Brief proposes highly focused interventions which can be evaluated quantitatively and deployed across multiple platforms, using an evolving set of messaging themes that are informed by the results of evaluation and reiterated with adjustments to improve efficacy. DOI: 10.19165/2016.2 
Introduction
The field of strategic counter-terrorism communications has been blessed, or cursed, with an overabundance of creativity. Many ideas for countering violent extremism (CVE) or preventing violent extremism (PVE) have been advanced, but they are often ungrounded in existing research on disengagement from armed movements, with many approaches based on assumptions that have been largely discredited, such as claims that poor economic conditions or lack of education contribute to violent extremism. 1 The wide scope of these efforts often results in programme proposals that are unwieldy and are never implemented.
Disengagement Over De-Radicalisation
Rather than try to solve all of the world's problems in the name of CVE -an outlier challenge involving fractional percentages of any given population -this paper approaches the issue with a limited scope. The goal of CVE programmes should be to encourage disengagement from violent extremist social networks. Participation in VE social networks -i.e., knowing someone who is a violent extremist, either online or off -is one of the few reliable indicators that someone may present a security concern.
2 Disrupting extremist efforts to draw vulnerable individuals into their social networks is a practical, achievable goal. Because messaging is intrinsic to these VE recruitment networks, particularly in the West, initial efforts should focus on countermessaging and disruption, with an eye toward developing findings on effective themes and approaches that can inform offline efforts.
A review of the literature on disengagement reveals that participants in armed movements -including but not limited to terrorist groups -can be prompted to leave chiefly by negative perceptions about the movement in question.
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Family considerations also featured prominently in decisions to disengage. Family issues are complex and individualised. For instance, some of the appeal of countercultural extremist movements lies in differentiating from parental values. In other cases, such as dysfunctional families, an intervention can be ineffective or counterproductive. While such interventions should be explored, they are difficult to fit into programmatic guidelines. Additionally complicating efforts to address the most significant VE challenge in the current global environment, the so-called "Islamic State" (IS) has been very successful at repelling family interventions.
Disengagement is a preferable goal to "de-radicalisation," which is frequently the focus of CVE and always the focus of PVE. Disengagement is the process by which individuals ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… cease to be mobilised in support of a violent extremist movement. De-radicalisation is the process by which individuals cease to hold extremist beliefs.
De-radicalisation is worth pursuing as a separate line of effort, but such approaches are problematic as a direct, measurable way to reduce violent behavior, because they deal with the internal thought processes of individuals. Disengagement focuses on behavior and thus is less subjective and more quantifiable. It is also easier to design programmes that promote disengagement without relying on questionable assumptions about the causes of violent extremism.
Extremist Processes Radicalisation Model
Discussions of radicalisation have been controversial at times, due to the lack of a clear definition of what it means to be radical. Radicalism is not a bad thing, per se, and can include such activities as the pursuit of civil rights. Additionally, only a tiny percentage of people with radical views will become terrorists, with the vast majority participating only in social activism. Finally, some models have been focused on jihadism to the exclusion of understanding a process that pertains to multiple ideologies. 4 Nevertheless, it is useful to have some sort of model to understand the process that sometimes leads to violent participation in extremism. The model proposed here is intended to provide measurable transitions that can be used to identify audiences for strategic counter-terrorism communications.
A six-step process model is proposed, which people who are vulnerable to engagement with violent extremist social networks can exit at any point:
1. Curiosity -recruitment target's first contact with a VE ideology.
2. Consideration -target evaluates the VE ideology for credibility, relevance.
3. Identification -target identifies him/herself as an adherent of VE ideology.
4. Self-critique -target asks whether he or she is doing ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… Figure 1 : A typical radicalisation model enough for the cause. If the answer is yes, the self-critique repeats periodically. If the answer is no, the target proceeds to the next step.
5. Decision to act -target decides whether to undertake violent or material action on behalf of VE ideology. If the decision is made to act, the target proceeds to Movement-critique. If decision is not to act, the target either disengages from the radicalisation process or revisits an earlier stage.
6. Movement-critique -target asks if the cause is doing enough for him or her. If the movement is not seen as deserving of the sacrifices a target makes on its behalf, the user may disengage. If the movement is seen as worthy, the selfcritique repeats and more action may be taken.
These steps are not always linear, and some at-risk individuals may skip steps entirely, but most people will pass through most of the stages. After the sixth step, the selfcritique is reiterated. The typical route is pictured in Figure 1 .
IS Recruitment Process
As discussed at length in the author's paper "Tailored Online Interventions: The Islamic State's Recruitment Strategy," 5 IS has taken a five-step approach to recruitment.
1. Discovery -Target's first contact with IS.
2. Create micro-community -IS introduces recruiters to target's environment.
3. Isolate target from mainstream -Recruiters encourage target to cut ties with mainstream, friends and family.
4. Shift to private communications -Recruiters move from open-source to closed.
5. Identify and encourage most-likely action -In both open and closed source communications, recruiters promote actions including hijra (emigration to IS territories), "lone wolf" attacks, and more advanced social media activism such as promoting the return of suspended accounts and taking part in organised posting campaigns.
It should be noted that this process has already been subjected to significant disruption by the growing number of social media suspensions targeting IS supporters. 6 Account suspensions have made discovery difficult, although far from impossible, and based on anecdotal observation, they have had an especially negative impact on the second step. IS's "micro-community" strategy relies on users being constantly available for conversation under the same name and user handle, in order to build trust. When accounts are frequently suspended, and sometimes replaced with fake accounts posing as known community members, this stage of the process becomes difficult. ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… However, suspensions have facilitated the third step, isolation, for users who proceed that far in the process. When a potential IS supporter's account is repeatedly suspended, he or she is more likely to follow only IS supporters when returning with a newly created account. Additional research to evaluate the pros and cons of these competing dynamics is recommended.
Five Ds of CVE
In keeping with the models discussed above, violent extremist networks seek to elicit one or both of the following responses from participants:
1. Adoption of extremist belief 2. Decision to act, through material support or criminal activity CVE programmes rarely distinguish between these two outcomes. There are many challenges in trying to shape belief, including tactical challenges and a limited ability to measure success. Disrupting the decision to act is a more practical and deployable approach, since it can be measured more reliably and it addresses the most fundamental problem presented by violent extremism -namely, violence.
A review of the literature on disengagement strongly suggests that people leave armed movements and terrorist groups because they develop negative perceptions of the group, rather than moving directly to the adoption of positive counter-values.
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These perceptions can be used as levers to discourage engagement with, and action on behalf of, violent extremist movements. These levers address both extremist belief and the will to act. CVE programmes should test each lever using all available metrics to determine their effectiveness. Specifically, in an online environment, it is possible to track users who are in contact with VE social networks and to track whether and when they cease contact (such as by unfollowing VE influencers or abandoning efforts to seek information about VE organisations). The Five Ds of CVE, which are derived from qualitative and quantitative case studies on disengagement, 8 seek to produce the following outcomes among target audiences: 
Macro-Mezzo-Micro
As discussed in the ICCT paper "A Brief History of Propaganda during Conflict" 9 and the corresponding Policy Brief, "Lessons from History for Counter-Terrorism Strategic Communications," 10 strategic communications can be usefully framed on three levels:
 Macro -Reach, relevance and resonance of messaging  Mezzo -Medium, messenger and format  Micro -Rational-and Identity-Choice, defensive/offensive, say-do gap
The Macro-Mezzo-Micro framing helps policymakers maximise the effectiveness of messaging programmes, based on historical trends in propaganda and persuasion, and identifying the key elements of a strategic communications campaign, including content, format and method of delivery.  Target audience should be limited to people already exposed to violent extremist propaganda or social networks, or those demonstrably seeking such exposure (for example, by using clearly identifiable search terms).
 The goal of messaging and other countermeasures (such as suspending the social media accounts of recruiters) should be to sever contact between the target audience and extremist social networks.
 Based on research that examines why people disengage from armed movements, messaging should seek to promote negative views about specific VE movements, rather than to instill positive social values.
 Messaging programmes should correlate to quantifiable models of radicalisation and extremist recruitment, and results should be evaluated based measurements of how the target audience disengages from the VE network, rather than broader metrics such as likes, followers and impressions.
 Programmes should address all of the key elements of an effective messaging programme, including macro, mezzo and micro considerations.
